



TINEXTA GROUP

**Innovation in Cyber Intrusions:
The Evolution of TA544**



DEFENCE BELONGS TO HUMANS

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Introduction

Innovation is not only an activity performed by companies, committed to protecting their perimeter, but is also an provided by threat actors. In fact, while organizations are investing in cybersecurity operations, such buying or implementing digital defenses, threat actors are implementing new strategies to bypass those protections.

An example of this type of innovation is TA544, also known as Narwhal Spider, Gold Essex, and recently known as Ursnif Gang, the notorious group hit Italy in past with massive attacks waves of Ursnif malware past years.

During last weeks, we observed a significant evolution in its TTPs, involving the adoption of new cyber weapons in all its infection chain, such as the abandon of Ursnif in favor of HijackLoader, aka IDAT Loader, and the delivery of other malware payloads, likes Remcos and SystemBC, passing through a massive abuse the DLL sideloading.

In the case under observation, the goal of the infection is to lead to the execution of the RAT (Remote Administration Tool) RemCosRAT, a lightweight and legitimate software used for remote control which is used by cybercriminals to facilitate access to infected machines and purse its new goal of Initial Access broker inside the new cybercriminal business model.




Figure 1: TA544 brand new Infection Chain

Technical Analysis

During last weeks, we observed a serious variation in TA544's cyber intrusions. The new infection chain involves new components and attack procedures. For this report, we take in exam the campaign spread on 21th November and [reported](#) by the independent Security Researcher @JAMESWT_MHT.

The infection chain starts with a malicious mail containing a malicious link, which downloads a URL file, having the following static information.

SHA256	e3454a40e1903c9369f74b323df4dda0931449a0321cd3ae21f3e8d0ff92b93c
Threat	IDAT Loader/Remcos
Threat Description	Url downloading IDAT Loader payload

This file can be treated as a Internet shortcut, containing a pointer to a remote resource in the Internet. Generally this kind of threat contains a HTTP link, but a recent TTP is to abuse the SMB protocol and point to a public share, so enabling the next stage of the infection.




Figure 2: URL downloading the first executable

So, the URL downloads the first executable of the infection chain, which, after attribution, is a new version of IDAT Loader. This is a relatively new malware, first reported by [Rapid7 researchers](#). During this infection chain, IDATLoader is widely used in all the intermediate stages in both Executable and DLL version.

The First IDATLoader packer is a trojanized executable written in C++, containing a simple, but sometimes effective anti-analysis trick: if the name is exactly the one intended to be by the attacker, the infection goes on, otherwise the malware evades by showing a MessageBox of a generic error.

The algorithm is quite easy. The malware retrieves the file name thanks to the **GetModuleFileNameW** API call. Then it performs two checks on that filename. The first one is quite easy: it is only the length of the name compared to the hardcoded one; the second one iterates the characters of the filename and sums the hexadecimal value of each character with the next one, the result of this operation then is checked against an hardcoded value in the rdata section:

The image shows a debugger window with assembly code and a hex dump. The assembly code is as follows:

```

0096854A 68D1 00      imul ecx,ecx,0
0096854D 8845 F4    mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-C]
00968550 884D D0    mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-30]
00968553 380C10    cmp ecx,dword ptr ds:[eax+edx]
00968556 74 33     je agenzia_entrata_2023.968588
00968558 BA 04000000 mov edx,4
0096855D C1E2 00   shl edx,0
00968560 8845 F4    mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-C]
00968563 884D D0    mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-30]
00968566 380C10    cmp ecx,dword ptr ds:[eax+edx]
00968569 74 20     je agenzia_entrata_2023.968588
0096856B 6A 10     push 10
0096856D 8855 F8    mov edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-8]
00968570 8842 2C    mov eax,dword ptr ds:[edx+2C]
00968573 50        push eax
00968574 884D F8    mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-8]
00968577 8851 30    mov edx,dword ptr ds:[ecx+30]
0096857A 52        push edx
0096857B 6A 00     push 0
0096857D FF15 AC18AB00 call dword ptr ds:[<&MessageBoxA@77D1F35C]
00968583 6A 00     push 0
00968585 FF15 5014AB00 call dword ptr ds:[<&ExitProcess@77D1F35C]
00968588 C745 F0 00000000 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-10],0
00968592 C745 E8 04000000 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-18],4
00968599 8845 EC    mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-14]
0096859C 05 0A020000 add eax,20A
    
```

The hex dump at the bottom shows the current instruction and the next one:

```

55 Hex
7AE 87 08 | 00 00 | 7B 09 00 00 | EF 7F 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 | ...{...}...
    
```

The value 87 08 is highlighted in a red box, and a red arrow points to the value 887 in the register window, which is also highlighted in a red box.

Figure 3: Filename check

If these checks pass, the malware downloads the file <https://mailsbestfriend.com/downloads/Filters/FILTER-SOLICIT.txt> and from its content builds the string **InitOnceExecuteOnce**, which is a function used to execute the

next subroutine. This API call is extensively abused in this malware because of its callback design, even useful when dealing with the execution of shellcodes. Then it uses the same technique for VirtualAlloc and writes shellcode to the allocated memory, which is a trampoline to decode and inject another stage of shellcode inside the PLA.DLL library, a legit Microsoft library (Performance Logs and Alerts Library) which provides the ability to generate alert notifications based on performance counter thresholds.

After dynamically loading the APIs in this new shellcode hosted inside PLA.dll, the malware downloads a png hosted on [hxxps://i.imgur.com/gmknwUN.png](https://i.imgur.com/gmknwUN.png). At this point the behaviour of IDAT Loader emerges: the shellcode is responsible for looking for "IDAT" structures inside the PNG file and extracting the next stage code.




Figure 4: PNG containing the next stage using steganography.

At a first instance, this image seems to be a legit image, but in the bottom part there is not rendered well, indicating the possibility of an hidden payload, with a sort of steganography. This hypothesis is confirmed by inspecting the code and viewing a particular routine aimed at comparing the next 4 bytes after "IDAT" header of the png file with a hardcoded value:

The screenshot displays a debugger window with assembly code on the left and registers on the right. A red arrow points from the instruction `call 2A22454` to the `EAX` register, which contains the value `0DEC5E78`. Below the assembly view, a memory dump window shows the next 4 bytes after IDAT, with a red arrow pointing to the hex value `C6 A5 79 EA`.

Figure 5: Comparing the next 4 bytes after IDAT

When the hardcoded value is checked, the malware starts the decryption and decompression routine for the next stage of the malware:

The screenshot displays a debugger window with assembly code on the left and registers on the right. The assembly view shows instructions like `push ecx`, `call 2A20284`, and `push ebp`. The memory dump window shows the decrypted and decompressed data, with a red arrow pointing to the hex value `C6 A5 79 EA`.

Figure 6: Decryption and decompression

Then, after the decoding phase, the malware writes all the extracted files inside the "%appdata%\Roaming\DebugApp_v1" directory. After writing the files, the malware invokes the API call **CreateProcessW** in order to execute "liveupdate.exe", which will sideload "log.dll" library.




Figure 7: Next stage containing the trojanized log.dll

The "log.dll" library is a trojanized dependency read by the "liveupdate.exe" process, which immediately reads the "jouk.mpg", an encrypted file containing the shellcode to load in memory aimed at propagating the infection to the next stages. This new piece of code has the goal to set as an environment variable with the same code thanks to the **SetEnvironmentVariableW** API call, in to retrieve it in the next stage through the **GetEnvironmentVariableW** call.

This new step is to run a cmd.exe process through the **CreateProcessW** API call inject a piece of shellcode, performed though the Heaven's Gate technique and a series of direct syscalls. Heaven's Gate technique in malware analysis refers to a sophisticated method employed by malicious software to obscure its code and evade detection. This technique involves switching between 32-bit and 64-bit execution modes during runtime, complicating the analysis process. By utilizing specific opcodes, such as the 0x33 operand prefix, malware can dynamically transition from 32-bit to 64-bit mode or vice versa. Direct syscalls, on the other hand, represent a low-level approach in malware execution, in this way, threat actors are able to bypass standard library functions, allowing malware to interact with the operating system kernel at a more fundamental level.

The principal syscalls aimed at the injection routine are **NtCreateSection**, **NtMapViewOfSection** and **NtWriteVirtualMemory** to remotely load even this time the **pla.dll** library inside the just created cmd.exe process and then inject the shellcode inside its .text section.




Figure 8: Using heaven's gate and direct syscall for the injection.

An instance of direct syscall used by the malware is the case of **NtWriteVirtualMemory**, the routine aimed at write the code inside the remote process' memory. In the following figure, it represented the opcode of the syscall along with the parameters pushed on the stack.




Figure 9: NtWriteVirtualMemory through syscall to inject shellcode to cmd.exe

At this point, the malware writes a file in the temporary folder with a random name, which contains the RemCos payload with other configuration data and additional modules for IDAT Loader.




Figure 10: Writing a file in %temp%

This data is decrypted using XOR with a hardcoded key. For the analysis sample is **EC4837D0**.




Figure 11: Decryption of the temporary file.

When the control passes to the cmd.exe process, the shellcode injected inside the **pla.dll** library.

At this point the shellcode sets the malware persistence through the creation of a LNK pointing to the “%appdata%\Roaming\DebugApp_v1\liveupdate.exe” file. This technique is quite effective because all the security controls consider that kind of operation as legit because the liveupdate executable is legit.




Figure 12: Setting up the persistence.

Evolution of TA544 Report



At this point, the malware goes on the infection chain by retrieving the temporary file written in the previous step and start the decryption of the Remcos payload contained inside that. The encryption is performed by using a XOR key 200 bytes-long, as shown in the following Figure.

The screenshot displays a debugger's assembly window and memory dump. The assembly window shows instructions such as `mov eax, dword ptr ss:[ebp+10]`, `mov ecx, dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]`, and `xor eax, dword ptr ds:[ecx*4]`. The memory dump window shows hex and ASCII data. A red box highlights a 200-byte XOR key, and another red box highlights the decrypted Remcos payload. A red arrow points from the assembly code to the memory dump.

Figure 13: Decryption of the Remcos payload

Then the malicious CMD process calls the **VirtualAlloc**, which allocates the memory to write the final shellcode. However, this long payload is injected inside another instance of the **explorer.exe** process created through the **CreateProcessInternalW** API call in suspended mode and injects that shellcode inside of it.




Figure 14: NtWriteVirtualMemory through syscall to inject shellcode to explorer.exe

Instead, for the injection of the Remcos payload, the malware uses the Heaven's Gate as mentioned in the previous stage. The routine is to create a new section inside the cmd.exe process through the NtCreateSection and the map it on the target process through the **NtMapViewOfSection** syscall, with the code **0x28**. This method works because the malware points to the handle to new **explorer.exe** process.




Figure 15: Mapping the Remcos Payload to explorer.exe

The last step of the analysis is to confirm that is Remcos malware. As report by many security firms, Remcos stores its configuration inside a resource, protecting it with a RC4 key long the first byte of that resource, and appended to the key there is the encrypted configuration:

The screenshot displays a software interface for hex editing and decryption. The main window is divided into several sections:

- Recipe:** Contains settings for the decryption process. Under "From Hex", the "Delimiter" is set to "Auto". Under "RC4", the "Passphrase" is "64 F0 15 C2 ..." and the "Input format" is "Latin1". The "Output format" is also set to "Latin1".
- Input:** A large text area containing a long hex string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

The 'Output' section shows the decoded configuration, which includes several IP addresses and domain names, such as "listpoints.online:6090:1*retghtgtrgtg.bounceme.net:3839:1*", "listpoints.click:7020:1*datastream.myvnc.com:5225:1*gservicese.com:2718:1*", and "center.onthewifi.com:8118:1*|RemoteHost|...".

A dialog box titled "RC4 Key Size" is open, and the "RC4 Key" field in the hex editor is highlighted. The hex editor shows a list of hex values, with the key "CF 72 32 C6 9F EE 2B C4 31 4C 6E 79 07 BC 83 2A" highlighted.

Figure 16: Remcos config

Conclusion

TA544 has been a constant threat in the past years to Italian organizations, in this report we wanted to highlight the importance to monitor the never-ending evolution of TTPs that occur to threat actors to elude defenses and be one step ahead. In the recent weeks after the longstanding wave of Ursnif spam, TA544 has switched to using IDAT Loader and Remcos, while also trying for a moment [SystemBC](#) as reported by the independent security researcher @JAMESWT_MHT

The evolution of the actor since 2017, when we started to monitor it is notable. This means that threat actors are realizing that they need to improve and innovate their TTPs in order to maintain their competitiveness high. Now, it is evident that TA544 is specializing in IAaaS (Initial Access as a Service). In fact, if we think about the Ursnif malware, we all know that has been designed to be as a Banking Trojan, but going on its evolution it is been evolved as backdoor for the Human Operated cyber intrusions as IAaaS and now with other RATs, like Remcos, SystemBC, etc.

Indicators of Compromise

- Hash
 - 2289f5e6c2e87cf4265ed7d05ef739d726ebd82614a1b856d4b5964834d307c9
 - 6e5db2efcad7fbacc72f1db53741d342a2524a481c4835885fe6c3a46e9036b3
 - dd277db4beda582c70402c9163491da27fde7cba2906f15e5beb8b2a394c400b
 - e02471f33d07a4f9046be6e7b15de68093bb72fdd15b61f3033aea57d9940108
- C2:
 - listpoints.]online:6090
 - retghrtgwtrtg.bounceme.]net:3839
 - listpoints.]click:7020
 - datastream.myvnc.]com:5225
 - gservice.]com:2718
 - center.onthewifi.]com:8118

Yara Rules

```
rule HijackLoader
{
meta:
    author = "Yoroi Malware ZLab"
    description = "Rule for IDAT Loader initial sample"
    last_updated = "2023-11-27"
    tlp = "WHITE"
    category = "informational"

strings:
    $1 = {89 4D F4 C7 45 F8 00 00 00 00 C7 45 F? 00 00 00 00 8B 45 F? 8B 4D F4 0F B7 14 41 85 D2 74 ?? 8B
45 FC 8B 4D F4 0F B7 14 41 03 55 F8 89 55 F8 8B 45 FC 83 C0 01 89 45 FC}

    $2 = {C7 45 FC 00 00 00 00 C7 45 F? 00 00 00 00 8B 45 F? 8D 14 00 8B 45 08 01 D0 0F B7 00 66 85 C0
74 ?? 8B 45 F8 8D 14 00 8B 45 08 01 D0 0F B7 00 0F B7 C0 01 45 FC 83 45 F8 01}

condition:
    any of them and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D
}
```

References

- <https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/08/31/fake-update-utilizes-new-idat-loader-to-execute-stealc-and-lumma-infostealers/>
- <https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-hijackloader>
- <https://resources.securityscorecard.com/all/lumna-stealer#page=1>
- https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/1726843869789127160
- https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/1726588073323135194
- <https://j00ru.vexillum.org/syscalls/nt/64/>



TINEXTA GROUP

Yoroi S.r.l.

www.yoroi.company - info@yoroi.company

Piazza Sallustio, 9

00187 – Roma (RM)

+39 (051) 0301005

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