

# Innovation in Cyber Intrusions: The Evolution of TA544



## **DEFENCE BELONGS TO HUMANS**



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## Introduction

Innovation is not only an activity performed by companies, committed to protecting their perimeter, but is also an provided by threat actors. In fact, while organizations are investing in cybersecurity operations, such buying or implementing digital defenses, threat actors are implementing new strategies to bypass those protections.

An example of this type of innovation is TA544, also known as Narwhal Spider, Gold Essex, and recently known as Ursnif Gang, the notorious group hit Italy in past with massive attacks waves of Ursnif malware past years.

During last weeks, we observed a significant evolution in its TTPS, involving the adoption of new cyber weapons in all its infection chain, such as the abandon of Ursnif in favor of HijackLoader, aka IDAT Loader, and the delivery of other malware payloads, likes Remcos and SystemBC, passing through a massive abuse the DLL sideloading.

In the case under observation, the goal of the infection is to lead to the execution of the RAT (Remote Administration Tool) RemCosRAT, a lightweight and legitimate software used for remote control which is used by cybercriminals to facilitate access to infected machines and purse its new goal of Initial Access broker inside the new cybercriminal business model.




Figure 1: TA544 brand new Infection Chain



# **Technical Analysis**

During last weeks, we observed a serious variation in TA544's cyber intrusions. The new infection chain involves new components and attack procedures. For this report, we take in exam the campaign spread on 21th November and <u>reported</u> by the independent Security Researcher @JAMESWT\_MHT.

The infection chain starts with a malicious mail containing a malicious link, which downloads a URL file, having the following static information.

SHA256	e3454a40e1903c9369f74b323df4dda0931449a0321cd3ae21f3e8d0ff92b93c
Threat	IDAT Loader/Remcos
Threat Description	Url downloading IDAT Loader payload

This file can the treated as a Internet shortcut, containing a pointer to a remote resource in the Internet. Generally this kind of threat contains a HTTP link, but a recent TTP is to abuse the SMB protocol and point to a public share, so enabling the next stage of the infection.

📔 Direzione P	roperties				Х
General Web	Document	Security	Details	Previous Versions	
Direzio	one				_
URL:	file://62.	173.146.1	11\scarica	a\Agenzia_Entrate_	2
Shortcut key:	None				
Visits:	Unknown				

Figure 2: URL downloading the first executable



So, the URL downloads the first executable of the infection chain, which, after attribution, is a new version of IDAT Loader. This is a relatively new malware, first reported by <u>Rapid7 researchers</u>. During this infection chain, IDATLoader is widely used in all the intermediate stages in both Executable and DLL version.

The First IDATLoader packer is a trojanized executable written in C++, containing a simple, but sometimes effective anti-analysis trick: if the name is exactly the one indented to be by the attacker, the infection goes on, otherwise the malware evades by showing a MessageBox of a generic error.

The algorithm is quite easy. The malware retrieves the file name thanks to the **GetModuleFileNameW** API call. Then it performs two checks on that filename. The first one is quite easy: it is only the lengh of the name compared to the hardcoded one; the second one iterates the characters of the filename and sums the hexadecimal value of each character with the next one, the result of this operation then is checked against an harcoded value in the rdata section:

5 00 GE 0 2 00 30 0 +67+65+6E+	0 32 00 33 00	61 00 74 00 65 00 5F 0 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 0 E+74+72+61+74+65+5F+32+30	2.0.2.3e.x.e.
00968540 00968540 00968550 00968550 00968556 00968556 00968560 00968560 00968560 00968560 00968560 00968560 00968573 00968573 00968573 00968574 00968573 00968574 00968573 00968573 00968574 00968573 00968574 00968573 00968574 00968574 00968578 00968578 00968588 00968588 00968588 00968588 00968588 00968588 00968588 00968590 00968590	68D1 00 8845 F4 884D D0 380C10 7 74 33 BA 04000000 C1E2 00 8845 F4 884D D0 8845 F4 884D D0 380C10 7 74 20 6A 10 8855 F8 8842 2C 50 884D F8 8851 30 52 6A 00 FF15 <u>5014AB00</u> C745 E8 040000 8845 EC 05 0A020000		301     EBP     0093F3CC       edx]     ESP     0093F3CC       ESP     0093F3CC     ESP       edx]     ESP     0093F3CC       ESP     00907378     EDI       -30     EIP     00968553       +edx]     EFLAGS     00000       ZE 0     PE 1     AE       QE 0     SE 0     DF       -80     QE 0     SE 0     DF       -81     QE 0     SE 0     DF       -83     GS 0028     FS 00     CS 0023     SS 00       rageBox4     GS 0028     FS 00     CS 0023     SS 00       0     -141     V     Default (stdcall)     1: [esp+4] 0097
and the second sec	ia_entrate_2023.ex		2: [esp+8] 0000 3: [esp+C] 75F3 4: [esp+10] 000 5: [esp+14] 763 [x=] Locals % Struct


Figure 3: Filename check

If these checks pass, the malware downloads the file *hxxps://mailsbestfriend.]com/downloads/Filters/FILTER-SOLICIT.txt* and from its content builds the string *InitOnceExecuteOnce*, which is a function used to execute the



next subroutine. This API call is extensively abused in this malware because of its callback design, even useful when dealing with the execution of shellcodes. Then it uses the same technique for VirtualAlloc and writes shellcode to the allocated memory, which is a trampoline to decode and inject another stage of shellcode inside the PLA.DLL library, a legit Microsoft library (Performance Logs and Alerts Library) which provides the ability to generate alert notifications based on performance counter thresholds.

After dynamically loading the APIs in this new shellcode hosted inside PLA.dll, the malware downloads a png hosted on *hxxps://i.imgur.jcom/gmknwUN.png.* At this point the behaviour of IDAT Loader emerges: the shellcode is responsible for looking for "IDAT" structures inside the PNG file and extracting the next stage code.



*Figure 4: PNG containing the next stage using steganography.* 

At a first instance, this image seems to be a legit image, but in the bottom part there is not rendered well, indicating the possibility of an hidden payload, with a sort of steganography. This hypothesis is confirmed by inspecting the code and viewing a particular routine aimed at comparing the next 4 bytes after "**IDAT**" header of the png file with a hardcoded value:






Figure 5: Comparing the next 4 bytes after IDAT

When the hardcoded value is checked, the malware starts the decryption and decompression routine for the next stage of the malware:




Figure 6: Decryption and decompression



Then, after the decoding phase, the malware writes all the extracted files inside the "%appdata%\Roaming\DebugApp\_v1" directory. After writing the files, the malware invokes the API call **CreateProcessW** in order to execute "**liveupdate.exe**", which will sideload "log.dll" library.

> AppData > Roaming > DebugApp\_v1




Figure 7: Next stage containing the trojanized log.dll

The "**log.dll**" library is a trojanized dependency read by the "liveupdate.exe" process, which immediately reads the "jouk.mpg", an encrypted file containing the shellcode to load in memory aimed at propagating the infection to the next stages. This new piece of code has the goal to set as an environment variable with the same code thanks to the **SetEnvironmentVariableW** API call, in to retrieve it in the next stage through the **GetEnvironmentVariableW** call.

This new step is to is to run a cmd.exe process through the *CreateProcessW* API call inject a piece of shellcode, performed though the Heaven's Gate technique and a series of direct syscalls. Heaven's Gate technique in malware analysis refers to a sophisticated method employed by malicious software to obscure its code and evade detection. This technique involves switching between 32-bit and 64-bit execution modes during runtime, complicating the analysis process. By utilizing specific opcodes, such as the 0x33 operand prefix, malware can dynamically transition from 32-bit to 64-bit mode or vice versa. Direct syscalls, on the other hand, represent a low-level approach in malware execution, in this way, threat actors are able to bypass standard library functions, allowing malware to interact with the operating system kernel at a more fundamental level.

The principal syscalls aimed at the injection routine are *NtCreateSection*, *NtMapViewOfSection* and *NtWriteVirtualMemory* to remotely load even this time the *pla.dll* library inside the just created cmd.exe process and then inject the shellcode inside its *.text* section.



74457240		
711F7349	66:8C65 FC	mov word ptr ss:[ebp-4], 5
711F734D	B8 2B000000	mov eax,2B
711F7352	66:8EE0	mov dword ptr ss: [ebp-c], esp Heaven's
711F7355	8965 F4	
711F7358	83E4 F0	and esp,FFFFFF0
711F735B	6A 33	Gate Gate
711F735D	E8 00000000	
711F7362	830424 05	add dword ptr ss:[esp],5
711F7366	CB	ret far
711F7367	40	dec eax
711F7368	8B4D AC	mov ecx, dword ptr ss:[ebp-54]
711F736B	48	dec eax
711F736C	8855 A4	mov edx, dword ptr ss: ebp-5C
711F736F	FF75 9C	push dword ptr ss:[ebp-64]
711F7372	49	dec ecx
711F7373	58	pop eax
711F7374	FF75 94	push dword ptr ss:[ebp-6C]
711F7377	49	dec ecx
711F7378	59	pop ecx
711F7379	FF75 B4	push dword ptr ss:[ebp-4C]
711F737C	48	dec eax
711F737D	5F	pop edi
711F737E	FF75 CC	push dword ptr ss:[ebp-34]
711F7381	48	dec eax
711F7382	5E	pop est
711F7383	48	dec eax
711F7384	8B45 C4	mov eax, dword ptr ss:[ebp-3C]
711F7387	A8 01	test al,1
711F7389	✓ 75 03	jne pla.711F738E
711F738B	83EC 08	sub_esp,8
711F738E	57	push edi
711F738F	48	dec eax
711F7390	8B7D B4	mov edi,dword ptr ss:[ebp-4C]
711F7393	48	dec eax
711F7394	85C0	test eax,eax
711F7396	74 16	je pla.711F73AE
711F7398	48	dec eax
711F7399	8D7CC7 F8	<pre>lea edi,dword ptr ds:[edi+eax*8-8]</pre>
711F739D	48	dec eax
711F739E	85C0	test eax,eax
711F73A0	✓ 74 0C	je pla.711F73AE
711F73A2	FF37	push dword ptr ds:[edi]
711F73A4	48	dec eax
711F73A5	83EF 08	sub edi,8
711F73A8	48	dec eax
711F73A9	83E8 01	sub eax,1
711F73AC	∧ EB EF	jmp pla.711F739D
711F73AE	FF75 AC	push dword ptr ss:[ebp-54]
711F73B1	49	dec ecx
711F73B2	5A	pop edx
711F73B3	48	
711F73B4	8B45 08	mov eax, dword ptr ss:[ebp+8] Direct
711F73B7	48	dec eax
711F73B8	83EC 28	sub esp,28 syscall syscalls
711F73BB	0F05	System

*Figure 8: Using heaven's gate and direct syscall for the injection.* 

An instance of direct syscall used by the malware is the case of *NtWriteVirtualMemory*, the routine aimed at write the code inside the remote process' memory. In the following figure, it represented the opcode of the syscall along with the parameters pushed on the stack.



● 711F7384 8845 08 mov eax,dword ptr ss: ● 711F7387 48 dec eax ● 711F7386 836C 28 sub esp. 28 ● 711F7388 0F05 Except < <	[ebp+8]	
.text:711F73BB pla.dll:\$73BB #67BB		
🕮 Dump 1 🗱 Dump 2 🚛 Dump 3 🚛 Dump 4 🚛 Dump 5 👹 Watch 1 💷 Locals 🖉 Stra	ruct	00F3E408 0000003A 00F3E400 00000001 005E410 00000218
711F1040 8A 88 0C 00 00 C7 85 D4 FC FF FF 40 5E C0 84 C7, C.000908A.C 711F1050 85 C8 FC FF FF 02 9F E6 6A C7 85 C4 FC FF FF F4	o - nettitude/SyscallsExtra: × + C	00000000 00F3E418 711F1000 pla.711F1000
711F10080 FF 31 74 BC 7F C7 85 14 FE FF FF C0 00 65 52 C7 y1C34.C. pyy2.rRC 711F1008 BC 7F S1 76 S4 14 FE F7 FF S1 76 S4 14 FE FF F5 D1. pyy2.hGC. byy3 711F1000 FE FF FF FF 11 F7 C 55 C7 F5 00 FE FF F5 D1. pyy2.hGC. byy3 711F1000 FE FF FF FF 11 F7 C 55 C7 F5 00 FE FF F5 F6 D1. pyy2.hGC. byy3 711F1000 FF 5A 60 00 F2 C7 85 F4 F0 FF F5 33 F6 FF F6 C 51 BF F7 V. byy3 711F1000 FF 5A 60 00 F2 C7 85 F4 F0 FF F5 33 F6 FF F7 C 10 yy2.aGC. byy3 711F1000 B5 56 A0 C7 85 E6 F0 FF FF F5 15 F7 C 53 99 75 C7 85 E6 FF F7 42. 0yy2.aGC. byy3 711F1100 B0 56 A0 C7 85 E6 F0 FF FF F5 15 A7 C3 B6 C0 FF FF 74 20 yy2.aGC. byy3 711F1100 FF FF F8 15 C7 55 C7 F5 00 FF FF F7 C3 99 75 C7 85 E6 F0 FF (C. byy3 711F1100 FF F7 F7 82 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C6 F0 FF (C. byy3 711F1110 5C C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C6 F0 FF (C. byy3 711F1110 5C C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C6 F0 FF (C. byy3 711F1110 5C C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C6 F0 FF (C. byy3 711F1110 5C C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C6 F0 F7 (C. byy3 711F110 5C C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C7 85 C6 F0 FF (C. byy3 711F110 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F110 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F110 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F110 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F110 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F10 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F10 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F10 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F10 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F10 5C C7 85 C7 (S. C. byy3 711F10 5C C7 85	NtOpenProcess: 0x26 NtCreateThreadEx: 0xC5 NtWriteVirtualNemory: 0x3A ZwAllocateVirtualNemory: 0x18 NtCreateSection: 0x4A ZwManViewOfSection: 0x28	




At this point, the malware writes a file in the temporary folder with a random name, which contains the RemCos payload with other configuration data and additional modules for IDAT Loader.





This data is decrypted using XOR with a hardcoded key. For the analysis sample is **EC4837D0.** 






*Figure 11: Decryption of the temporary file.* 

When the control passes to the cmd.exe process, the shellcode injected inside the **pla.dll** library.


At this point the shellcode sets the malware persistence through the creation of a LNK file pointing to the *"%appdata%\Roaming\DebugApp\_v1\liveupdate.exe"* file. This technique is quite effective because all the security controls consider that kind of operation as legit because the liveupdate executable is legit.



*Figure 12: Setting up the persistence.* 



At this point, the malware goes on the infection chain by retrieving the temporary file written in the previous step and start the decryption of the Remcos payload contained inside that. The encryption is performed by using a XOR key 200 bytes-long, as shown in the following Figure.




*Figure 13: Decryption of the Remcos payload* 

Then the malicious CMD process calls the *VirtualAlloc*, which allocates the memory to write the final shellcode. However, this long payload is injected inside another instance of the *explorer.exe* process created through the **CreateProcessInternalW** API call in suspended mode and injects that shellcode inside of it.



70803830 8845 0C 70803833 48 70803834 483EC 28 70803837 0F05 <	mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp+C] dcc eax sub esp.28	
1 📲 Dump 2 👫 Dump 3 👫 Dump 4 👫 Dump 5	<sup>™</sup> Watch 1  Ix=  Locals      2 Struct       ASCII	02CFF738 0000003A 02CFE3C 0000001 02CFE740 000003E4 02CFF744 00000000
Image     B8     EC     B1     B2     D2     D0     D0     B1     B2     D3     D4     D3     D4     D3     D4     D3     D3 <thd< th=""><th>pývyPe<sup>*</sup>····A···P</th><th>02CFF744 0000000 02CFF748 00957AD0 02CFF74C 0000000 02CFF750 0540EB7</th></thd<>	pývyPe <sup>*</sup> ····A···P	02CFF744 0000000 02CFF748 00957AD0 02CFF74C 0000000 02CFF750 0540EB7
PD     FP     FP     F1     F1     F8     F1     O0     O0     O2     C4     S2     O0     O4     O0     C4     O4     C4     D4     D0     O4     O0     C4     D4     C4     D4     D4 <thd4< th="">     D4     D4     D4<!--</th--><td><math>E_{0,M}</math>, <math>W_{0,V}</math>, <math>W_{1,V}</math>, <math>E_{1,V}</math> <math>\leftarrow \rightarrow C</math> <math>\oplus</math> github.com/nettitude/SyscallsExtractor</td><td></td></thd4<>	$E_{0,M}$ , $W_{0,V}$ , $W_{1,V}$ , $E_{1,V}$ $\leftarrow \rightarrow C$ $\oplus$ github.com/nettitude/SyscallsExtractor	
AC 89 45 EC 88 40 98 89 40 E4 88 55 A4 89 55 E0 88 45 A0 89 45 DC 6A 38 6A 00 88 55 F4 80 80 50 FE FF FF E8 33 00 00 00 83 C4 08 85 55 F4 80 80 50 FF F5 51 E8 29 55 00 00 83 C4 04 89 45 F8 85 55 F6 88 45 EC 89 82 E0 0E 00 00 88 40 F8 0F 87 91 22	LE EUj;j.uô.P bývěsApýv VyelyA.Eo.uo	



Instead, for the injection of the Remcos payload, the malware uses the Heaven's Gate as mentioned in the previous stage. The routine is to create a new section inside the cmd.exe process through the NtCreateSection and the map it on the target process through the **NtMapViewOfSection** syscall, with the code **0x28**. This method works because the malware points to the handle to new **explorer.exe** process.




Figure 15: Mapping the Remcos Payload to exoplorer.exe

The last step of the analysis is to confirm that is Remcos malware. As report by many security firms, Remcos stores its configuration inside a resource, protecting it with a RC4 key long the first byte of that resource, and appended to the key there is the encrypted configuration:






Figure 16: Remcos config



# Conclusion

TA544 has been a constant threat in the past years to Italian organizations, in this report we wanted to highlight the importance to monitor the never-ending evolution of TTPs that occur to threat actors to elude defenses and be one step ahead. In the recent weeks after the longstanding wave of Ursnif spam, TA544 has switched to using IDAT Loader and Remcos, while also trying for a moment <u>SystemBC</u> as reported by the independent security researcher @JAMESWT\_MHT

The evolution of the actor since 2017, when we started to monitor it is notable. This means that threat actors are realizing that they need to improve and innovate their TTPs in order to maintain their competitiveness high. Now, it is evident that TA544 is specializing in IAaaS (Initial Access as a Service). In fact, if we think about the Ursnif malware, we all know that has been designed to be as a Banking Trojan, but going on its evolution it is been evolved as backdoor for the Human Operated cyber intrusions as IAaaS and now with other RATs, like Remcos, SystemBC, etc.



## **Indicators of Compromise**

- Hash
  - o 2289f5e6c2e87cf4265ed7d05ef739d726ebd82614a1b856d4b5964834d307c9
  - o 6e5db2efcad7fbacc72f1db53741d342a2524a481c4835885fe6c3a46e9036b3
  - o dd277db4beda582c70402c9163491da27fde7cba2906f15e5beb8b2a394c400b
  - o e02471f33d07a4f9046be6e7b15de68093bb72fdd15b61f3033aea57d9940108
- C2:
- o listpoints.]online:6090
- retghrtgwtrgtg.bounceme.]net:3839
- o listpoints.]click:7020
- o datastream.myvnc.]com:5225
- o gservicese.]com:2718
- o center.onthewifi.]com:8118

## Yara Rules

ule HijackLoader
neta:
author = "Yoroi Malware ZLab"
description = "Rule for IDAT Loader inital sample"
last_updated = "2023-11-27"
tlp = "WHITE"
category = "informational"
trings:
\$1 = {89 4D F4 C7 45 F8 00 00 00 00 C7 45 F? 00 00 00 00 8B 45 F? 8B 4D F4 0F B7 14 41 85 D2 74 ?? 8B 45 FC 8B 4D F4 0F B7 14 41 03 55 F8 89 55 F8 8B 45 FC 83 C0 01 89 45 FC}
\$2 = {C7 45 FC 00 00 00 00 C7 45 F? 00 00 00 00 8B 45 F? 8D 14 00 8B 45 08 01 D0 0F B7 00 66 85 C0 74 ?? 8B 45 F8 8D 14 00 8B 45 08 01 D0 0F B7 00 0F B7 C0 01 45 FC 83 45 F8 01}
ondition:
any of them and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D



## References

- <u>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/08/31/fake-update-utilizes-new-idat-loader-to-execute-stealc-and-lumma-infostealers/</u>
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-hijackloader
- <u>https://resources.securityscorecard.com/all/lumna-stealer#page=1</u>
- https://twitter.com/JAMESWT\_MHT/status/1726843869789127160
- https://twitter.com/JAMESWT\_MHT/status/1726588073323135194
- <u>https://j00ru.vexillium.org/syscalls/nt/64/</u>





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